Total pages: 15pages
Chapter one introduces the topic.
Chapter two explains DDR, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration.
Chapter three analyses the reintegration in peace building.
Chapter four talks about the amnesty programme and DDR in Niger Delta and also talked about the need for pre-DDR planning
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.1 WHAT IS DDR?
- REINTEGRATION IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
4.1 AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND DDR IN NIGER DELTA
4.2 THE NEED FOR PRE-DDR PLANNING
All peace-building processes related to armed conflict must go through a final stage in which, after the signing of agreements, combatants surrender their arms, demilitarize, and reintegrate into civil life. This complex process is known as the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. DDR is part of broader agreements over justice, police reform, the restructuring of the armed forces, elections, political change, etc., as negotiated in a peace process. Therefore, DDR is part of a wider strategy of peace building.
This study is a comparative analysis of active, 2007 DDR programmes, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. The main goal of this year’s report is to provide an overall vision for the active DDR programmes and, as such, widen the general and current understanding of the process. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.
In the 2000s, issues concerning the Niger Delta were more popular in research on the Nigerian state. Clearly, this was informed by the fact that the period was synonymous with the age of increased agitations and violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. The large-scale violence experienced in the region in that period drastically affected Nigeria’s oil production and exportation, with devastating effects on the country’s economy given its over reliance on oil earnings as its national income. For instance, Nigeria’s oil production sharply dropped from 2.6 million barrels (per day) to 1.3 million barrels (per day) between 2005 and 2009, in the midst of consistent attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of oil workers by the militia groups in the region (Obi 2010). Given this situation, researchers were preoccupied with the task of studying the patterns of violence and agitation in the region, which produced works that analyze the origins of the crisis, the various actors involved in the crisis (their interests, solutions and recommendations), and other topical issues around the Niger Delta conflict (for example, Human Rights Watch 1999; Obi 1997; 2007; 2009; Oyefusi 2007; Omotola 2009; Ikelegbe 2005).
With the introduction and implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) by the Nigerian government in 2009 – which has become the euphemism for the government’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) policy on the Niger Delta – the direction of research naturally changed, and attention has increasingly shifted to the post-amnesty era of the Niger Delta. As such, there has been an appreciable development of literature on the topic of amnesty in the Niger Delta (Aghedo 2013; Ushie 2013; Eke 2014; Obi 2014; Agbiboa 2014; Oluwaniyi 2011a; Ojeleye 2011; Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011). While a handful of work on the topic has indeed been useful to understanding the background, challenges, and sustainability of the amnesty policy as a peace strategy in the Niger Delta, the main thrust of their assessment emphasizes the negative aspects of the policy with some sceptic views of the programme. For example, Cyril Obi argues that ‘… evidence so far suggests that the PAP is at best a fragile basis for sustaining peace and development in the oil-rich region in the medium to long term’ (Obi 2014:254). He further concludes: ‘The PAP has delivered to the government (rather than the people) the type of peace consistent with a status quo that maintains conditions for state ownership of oil, its optimal extraction in partnership with oil multinationals and the sharing of the spoils’ (Obi 2014:254). In a similar vein, Surulola Eke is of the view that ‘the deal was a “cash for peace” programme cloaked in “amnesty”; which has inadvertently increased the appeal of violence for those who seek a slice of the so-called “national cake”’ (Eke 2014:1).
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